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Introduction
Historically, state government has regulated certain aspects of the
marital relationship in order to further its interest in maintaining a stable and well-functioning society.1 Regulation of marriage and divorce,
and of marital duties and obligations, has always been considered
within the purview of state powers. In some circumstances the reach of
state power impacts on the private decision-making processes of families. However, state intrusion in child bearing, contraception and abortion decisions has not been condoned. 3 The United States Constitution
demands that state administration of family law in this area respect the
individual's right of privacy as well as the zone of privacy protecting
the family relationship. This note examines the history of the state's
role in regulating the abortion decision beginning with Roe v. Wade5
and concluding with Scheinberg v. Smith,6 which addressed the constitutionality of a spousal notice and consultation provision as a condition
to abortion.
Historical Overview
Roe v. Wade7 established that the right of privacy, "founded in the
1. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,
546 (1948).
2. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787,
795 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See also Note, Developments In The Law-The Constitution And The Family, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1156 (1980).
5. 410 U.S. 113.
6. Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Smith, 474 F.
Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Fourteenth Amendment concept of personal liberty and restriction
upon state action," 8 encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy. The Court cautioned that "this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation." 9
Any interference with this right requires a showing of "compelling
state interests" 1 0 and narrowly drawn legislative enactments expressing
"only the legitimate state interests at stake."1 1 Consonant with this
standard of review, the Court in Roe concluded that the state's interests in the health of the mother and in the protection of the potential
human life of the fetus were not sufficiently compelling in the first trimester of pregnancy to justify interference with an abortion decision
12
made by a physician and his patient.
Focus on Medical Procedures
Since Roe,13 state legislatures have promoted state interests in
mothers' health and in potential human lives by regulating medical
procedures associated with abortion. Courts have carefully reviewed
regulation of medical procedures to determine whether those legislated
measures constituted justifiable state interference with a woman's constitutional right to elect to terminate her pregnancy during the first
14
trimester.
One such regulatory measure was shown to be an undue invasion
of privacy and was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Doe v. Bolton.1 5 The Bolton Court construed a Georgia law
requiring both hospital committee approval of an abortion candidate

8. Id. at 153.
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id. at 155.
11. Id.
12. The Court in Roe noted that in light of present medical knowledge, state
interests in safeguarding the health of the mother assume "compelling" stature approximately at the end of the first trimester. The point at which the state's interest in
potential life becomes "compelling" is at viability, because this is when the fetus has
the "capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 154.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. See Note, supra note 4, at 1304.
15. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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and her physician's decision to terminate the pregnancy. 16 Because
committee review after the physician's approval would be review "once
removed from diagnosis"17 and "basically redundant,"1 8 the Court
could not find any "constitutionally justifiable pertinence"' 9 for that requirement. Additionally, the Court invalidated a provision of the law
which required that the abortion procedure be performed in an accredited hospital. It contended that the state failed to prove "that only the
full resources of a licensed hospital, rather than those of some other
appropriately licensed institution, [satisfied the] health interests."20
Seven years later, Illinois was unable to show any compelling interest furthered by a statutory requirement that doctors inform abortion candidates of possible fetal pain caused by particular abortion
methods. 2' The statute also mandated candidates wait twenty-four
hours between the consultation and operation. The Court referred to
the Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,22 which cautioned that reading more meaning into
the term "informed consent" 23 than "the giving of information to the
patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences...
might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable strait-jacket in the practice of his profession." 24 In Colautti v.
25 the Court struck a Pennsylvania law which defined fetal viaFranklin
bility vaguely and ambiguously, and subjected physicians to criminal
liability for failure to follow prescribed standards of care for viable fetuses. This exercise of state power unreasonably burdened the medical
profession. Moreover, this exercise unjustifiably hindered a woman's
choice to terminate first trimester pregnancy, in contravention of Roe.26

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
(1976).
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8
627 F.2d 772, 782.
Id.
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
410 U.S. 113.
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Focus on the Marital Relationship
Early abortion legislation, which focused on regulating medical
procedures, was predicated on state interests in protecting mothers'
health and potential human life. Later enactments demonstrate a shift
in focus as legislatures premise new statutes on the state's traditional
and more widely accepted role of regulating the marital relationship. In
support of a statute requiring a husband's written consent to his wife's
first trimester abortion, Missouri referred to its authority to impose
joint-consent requirements as conditions to child adoption and artificial
insemination.27 Despite Missouri's efforts to defend the statute as an
incident of its power to regulate the marital relationship, the United
States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthoodof Central Missouri v.
Danforth found the statute violative of standards enunciated in Roe.28
[T]he State cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the
state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.' Clearly, since the state cannot
regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate
authority to any particular person,
even the spouse, to prevent
29
abortion during that same period.
1 also effected a
Florida's statute,30 considered in Poe v. Gerstein,"
husband's unilateral veto power over his wife's abortion decision. Like
Missouri, Florida urged that this statute was a valid exercise of its general authority to promote society's interest in the marriage relationship.
The fifth circuit acknowledged the state has power to regulate certain
aspects of marriage or the marital relationship, but concluded that this

27. 428 U.S. 52, 68 (1976).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (citations omitted).
29. 428 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted).

30. Fla. Stat. § 458.22(3) (1975) states:
(3) WRITINGS REQUIRED - One of the following shall be obtained by
the physician prior to terminating a pregnancy:
(a) The written request of the pregnant woman and, if she is
married, the written consent of her husband, unless the husband is voluntarily living apart from the wife.
31. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
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intrusion into intra-familial decision-making processes concerning
childbearing could not be sanctioned3 2 in light of the Supreme Court's
3 Moreover, said the fifth circuit,
holding in Griswold v. Connecticut."
Eisenstadt v. Baird3 4 determined that the individual's right of privacy
included the right to be free from state interference with the childbearing decision.3 5
In Poe, the State of Florida's primary contention was that the consent statute was necessary to protect the rights of a husband whose
wife desires an abortion. This proposition was first examined in light of
a husband's interest in paternity of the fetus. The court criticized this
argument and referred to the common law's refusal to compensate fathers for tortious or criminal injury to the fetus.38 Furthermore, because the Florida statute did not require that the husband sire the fetus, nor even that the woman be married at time of conception to the
same man whose consent was later required for the abortion, the court
found a husband's interest in paternity of the fetus inapplicable.
The state proposed a second source for a husband's interest in his
wife's abortion decision - protection of procreative potential. Legislating against procreation outside marriage made a husband completely
dependent on his wife for legitimate offspring. Florida asserted its need
to legislate safeguards for a husband's procreative potential within the
confines of marriage.37 Noting that procreation of offspring is one of
the primary purposes of marriage,3 8 Florida postulated that a wife's
repeated abortions could deny her husband the opportunity to have
children. This result would impede the "right to have offspring" enunciated by the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 9 The court in Poe4" re32. id. at 795.
33. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
34. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35.
36.

Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 10 (1959).

For a discussion of the father's right, see Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42
L. REV. 441, 442-44 (1973).
37. 517 F.2d at 796.

CINN.

38.

See, e.g., Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (1942).

39.

In Skinner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court overturned a statute providing for

the sterilization by vasectomy or salpingectomy of habitual criminals on the grounds

that the statute "deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring." 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
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sponded to this argument, explaining that Skinner" did not guarantee
the individual a procreative opportunity, but merely safeguarded his
procreative potential from state infringement. "As a consequence we do
not read Skinner to permit state infringement upon the woman's fundamental right to abortion." 4' 2
The New Breed of Abortion Regulation
The constitutionality of governmental regulation of the marital decision-making process concerning abortion is currently defined by the
holdings in Poe' and Danforth.44 Thus, a statute granting a husband
absolute veto power over his wife's decision to terminate pregnancy will
be found unconstitutional notwithstanding the state's societal interests
in the marital relationship nor the husband's interest in the procreative
potential of the marriage. "However, neither Danforth nor Poe considered whether less intrusive measures designed to insure a husband's
participation in the abortion decision could, within constitutional contours, be predicated on these interests. 45
Scheinberg v. Smith 40 considered a challenge to the validity of a
Florida statute requiring a wife to give her husband notice of the proposed abortion and an opportunity to consult with her concerning the
procedure. The statute pertains only to a wife neither separated nor
estranged from her husband. The notice and consultation provision requires as a condition to securing the abortion, that the wife provide her
physician with either 1) a written statement that notice and opportunity have been given or 2) her husband's written consent.'7 The Act
provides that "[a]ny person who willfully performs or participates in
the termination of a pregnancy in violation of the requirements of this
section is guilty of a felony.' 8

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

517 F.2d 787.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
517 F.2d at 797.
517 F.2d 787.
482 U.S. 52 (1976).
Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 539 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(b) (1981).
Id.
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Scheinberg v. Smith
In 1979, the Florida Legislature enacted the Medical Practice Act,
which contained the following provision governing abortions sought by
married women:
If the woman is married, the husband shall be given notice of the
proposed termination of pregnancy and an opportunity to consult
with his wife concerning the procedure. The physician may rely on
a written statement of the wife that such notice and opportunity
was given, or he may rely on the written consent of the husband to
the proposed termination of the pregnancy. If the husband and wife
are separated or estranged, the provisions of this paragraph for notice or consent shall not be required. The physician may rely upon
a written statement from the wife that the husband is voluntarily
living apart or estranged from her.'9
Dr. Mark Scheinberg, 50 a licensed physician who performs abortions in Florida, filed a class action suit against state enforcement officials on behalf of all married pregnant women wishing to terminate
their pregnancies. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief on the
ground this provision unconstitutionally abridged married women's
rights to privacy in the abortion decision.
In July, 1979, the District Court denied Dr. Scheinberg's request
to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the spousal notice provision because it felt he had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success
for proving the provision violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. On final hearing two months later, the District
Court did, in fact, declare the provision unconstitutional, finding it to
be an overly inclusive means to promote marital harmony. State officers
appealed the decision, and in October 1981, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the case. The appellate court
held state interests in furthering the institutional integrity of the marital relationship were compelling, and were sufficient justification for enacting the spousal notice and consultation provision. In the context of
this state interest the court considered also the relation of paternal in49. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(10) (1981).
50. Formerly using the pseudonym John Jones, M.D. in Jones v. Smith, 474 F.
Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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terest in marital procreative potential. The case was remanded for factual determination of whether proper abortion procedures posed a
greater than de minimis risk to future childbearing capabilities.
The court of appeals examined the burden the notice and consultation provision imposed upon a woman's constitutionally protected right
to have an abortion. In order to trigger the strict scrutiny standard of
review the district court had required plaintiffs to show the provision
met the direct interference test of Charles v. Carey,51 or constituted a
new obstacle "in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice."' 52 In Charles, the seventh circuit declared unconstitutional a
provision of the Illinois abortion statute which required the physician
performing an abortion to conduct a consent consultation with his patient at least twenty-four hours prior to the operation. Based upon the
Charles5" court's reasoning, both the district and appellate courts in
Scheinberg required a showing that the burden imposed by the statute
was "not de minimis". 5 State regulation not directly interfering with a
woman's abortion decision is not strictly scrutinized and thus does not
call for a compelling state interest. The court of appeals, while recognizing that the notice and consultation provision of Florida's statute left
a married woman "with something less than the completely untrammeled freedom of choice," 55 compared that burden with the burden imposed by Missouri's statute stricken in Danforth.5 6 The statute in Danforth required husband consent as a prerequisite to abortion. The
Scheinberg court concluded "the intrusion into a woman's ability to
exercise freedom of choice is thus much less here than in Danforth."5
It is ironic that while citing Charles, the fifth circuit engaged in
that weighing process explicitly cautioned against in Charles. The
Charles decision proposed that "undue" defines the ultimate constitu51.
52.

627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
Harrisv. McRae proposed this as an alternative indication for strict scrutiny

review. 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).

53.
54.

627 F.2d 772.
Id. at 777.

55. 659 F.2d at 486.
56. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
57. 659 F.2d at 485. The court noted here that since the statute requires notice
and not consent, the intrusion into a woman's ability to exercise her freedom of choice
is therefore less here than in Danforth.
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tional issue, not merely the threshold requirement for imposing strict
scrutiny. 88 Further, the court in Charles found the defendant's proposed statutory interpretation - that the burden imposed must be undue in order to invoke strict scrutiny - contained no guidelines for
defining "undue" and would virtually preclude the application of strict
scrutiny to any state interference with the abortion decision. 3 ' The
Charles court recognized the dangers of deferring to state legislative
wisdom and therefore proscribed the permissible reach of state power
into the abortion decision. This reasoning led the Charles0 court to
conclude the Illinois abortion statute, requiring a twenty-four hour
mandatory waiting period between c~nsultation and operation, constituted a burden unjustified by state interests in a woman's first trimester
abortion decision. Similarly, the court of appeals in Scheinberg, after
acknowledging the provision's burden on a woman's freedom to terminate pregnancy during the first trimester, and recognizing the Court's
recent reaffirmation of Roe's61 mandate, could have invalidated the
statute. A recent sixth circuit case illustrates this point:
Since the State has no compelling interest during the first trimester
of pregnancy, no balancing [of State interests] is required. If a regulation results in a legally significant impact6 2or consequence on a
first trimester abortion decision, it is invalid.
Instead of ending its inquiry at this point, the Scheinberg court
considered the state's claim of compelling interests in maintaining and
promoting the marital relationship and in protecting the husband's interest in the procreative potential of marriage. It stated:
[T]hese interests, weighed together and, for purposes of analysis,
telescoped into a state interest in furthering the integrity of statecreated and regulated institutions of marriage and the family, are
'sufficiently weighty,' Poe, to justify the burden on a woman's abor58. 627 F.2d at 777.
59. Id.
60. 627 F.2d 772.
61. 410 U.S. 113.
62. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198,
1204 (6th Cir. 1981).
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tion decision imposed by the spousal notification requirement. 63
The Scheinberg court manipulated Supreme Court precedents,
Zablocki v. Redhail6 and Griswold v. Connecticut,65 to support its
conclusion that the institution of marriage, the cornerstone of civilized
society, is deserving of heightened protection under the constitution. In
Zablocki,6 6 the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law prohibiting remarriage of non-custodial parents under support orders absent court approval. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion identified "[t]he problem
in this case [as] not one of discriminatory classifications, but of unwarranted encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom. 67 The
statute found unconstitutional in Griswold"6 operated directly on an intimate relation between husband and wife, as well as their physician's
role in one aspect of that relation."9 The Court viewed the relationship
as "lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. 7 0
Furthermore, the court's decision in Poe7 1 specifically rejected the
notion that state intrusion into intra-familial decision-maling processes
concerning childbearing could be justified by state interests in promoting the marital relationship. The fifth circuit read Zablocki,"2 Griswold"3 and Poeq' to support state regulation of the marriage relationship. Somehow the circuit court avoided the stress those decisions
placed on the importance of marriage as an area of privacy deserving
of respect and protection from government interference. Thus, the logical extension of the principles denoted in Zablocki, Griswold, and Poe
is that the notice and consultation provision unconstitutionally impinges
upon a husband's and wife's individual right to be free from governF.2d
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 483 (citations omitted).
374 (1978).
479 (1965).
374.

63.
64.
65.
66.

659
434
381
434

67.

Id. at 391-92 (J. Stewart's concurring opinion).

68.

381 U.S. 479.

69.

Id. at 503 (J. White's concurring opinion).

70.

Id. at 485 (J. Douglas, opinion for the majority).

71.

517 F.2d 787.

72.
73.
74.

434 U.S. 374.
381 U.S. 479.
517 F.2d 787.
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ment intrusion into their personal relationship.
The Scheinberg court urged that the notice and consultation requirement has the effect of furthering "the integrity of marital, and
hence familial, life."'7 5 This conclusion was adduced from expert testimony on record from the district court. The experts, a professional array of communication encouragers, included gynecologists, obstetricians, psychiatrists and psychologists..7 No matter how persuasive the
appellate court found that testimony, the court failed to draw a distinction between a qualified professional's recommendation that his married patients communicate and a state's mandate that its married citizens communicate.
Because "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up," 7 the decision to
terminate a pregnancy is not always the product of mutual agreement.
Differences in individual moral and religious convictions might account
for a deadlock between mates in the abortion decision. Additionally, in
situations where a woman has become pregnant by someone other than
her husband, either voluntarily or as the consequence of rape, and fears
physical or emotional abuse, communication of her intention to terminate the pregnancy could have a deleterious effect on the future of the
marriage.7 8 The experts indicated that forced communication does not
necessarily enhance the quality of a marriage and might in many instances produce anxiety and stress, causing the wife to self-abort or to
procure an illegal abortion. 9 It is ironic that under these circumstances, the notice and consultation provision could contribute to the
destruction of the same state interest the legislation was designed to
protect, namely the "authenticity" 80 of marriage. The state's stated
75. 659 F.2d at 484.
76. The precise nature of this testimony and the qualifications of the experts are
explained in Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. at 538.
77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
78. 482 F. Supp. at 538.
79. Id.
80. "By authenticity we mean a marital relationship characterized by institutional integrity ... the concept we wish to convey is that the state has an interest in
attempting to ensure that the institution of marriage maintains its identity with its
conceptual essence." 659 F.2d at 484.
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goal - preserving the integrity of the marital relationship - could be
better achieved by refraining from involvement in private marital communications concerning childbearing. Certainly, this result would be
consistent with the Zablocki,8 1 Griswold,8 2 and Poe83 decisions.
The court of appeals remanded Scheinberg for factual findings
necessary to determine whether the provision could withstand constitutional attack despite its failure to limit the notice and consultation requirements to jointly-conceived children." The court also directed the
district court to inquire whether abortion procedures detrimentally affect future childbearing capabilities, 85 which in turn might hamper the
procreative potential of the marriage.
The fifth circuit, by remanding to learn whether abortion has more
than a "de minimis" effect on a woman's fertility, may be indicating
that a husband's procreative potential can constitute a compelling state
interest-a status not acknowledged in previous decisions. The Supreme Court in Danforth8 8 expressed an awareness of the "deep and
proper concern and interest that a devoted and protective husband has
in his wife's pregnancy.18 7 Yet in balancing a husband's concern
against his wife's freedom of choice in undergoing abortion, the Court
in Danforth concluded: "it is the woman who physically bears the child
and who is more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy
[;therefore,] as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.""
The propriety of a husband's concern in his wife's pregnancy was also
recognized in Griswold.89 From Danforth and Griswold one may deduce a husband has a proper concern and interest in his wife's pregnancy. But Griswold" and Danforth9" cannot be read to suggest that

81. 434 U.S. 374.
82. 321 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. 517 F.2d 787.
84. 659 F.2d at 486.
85. The authors concluded "that induced abortion has no or little, if any, effect
on risk of ectopic pregnancy in subsequent reproduction under a generally favorable
condition." C.S. Chung, M. Mi, R.G. Smith, P.G. Steinhoff, Induced Abortion and
Ectopic Pregnancy in Subsequent Pregnancies (Rev. man. at 12) (19-).
86. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
87. Id. at 69.
88. Id. at 71.
89. 321 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id.
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the husband's interest in the procreative potential of the marriage
should be considered a compelling state interest justifying legislation
which burdens a woman's fundamental right to a first trimester
abortion.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals in Scheinberg, relying upon the
authority of Skinner,92 found the husband's ability to procreate entitled
to constitutional protection. As a corollary to this proposition, the court
acknowledged that the state has a "compelling interest in requiring a
wife to inform her husband when she is contemplating termination of a
pregnancy.19 3 In Skinner," the Supreme Court protected an individual
from sterilization by the State of Oklahoma. The rights established in
that case were intended to protect an individual from unjustified governmental intrusion in matters of procreation. As noted earlier, the
court in Poe 95 explained, "Skinner did not guarantee the individual a
procreative opportunity; it merely safeguarded his procreative potential
from state infringement." 96 Consequently, Poe 97 did not interpret Skinner98 to permit state infringement upon a woman's fundamental right
to an abortion. As noted in appellee's petition for rehearing in
Scheinberg, "the court has misapprehended the decision in Poe as it
interprets the rights established in Skinner,. . . [which] were intended

as a shield against governmental interference with individual rights.
The decision was not intended to be a sword which could be used to
enhance a State's power over its citizens." 9 Rehearing was denied.
Constitutional Objections
The notice and consultation provision in the Florida Medical Practice Act is prone to attack as an infringement upon first amendment
freedom of speech guarantees. Because this provision requires a wife to
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

428 U.S. 52.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
659 F.2d at 485.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
517 F.2d 787.
Id. at 797.
517 F.2d 787.
316 U.S. 535.
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, Case No. 80-5023 at 3-4.
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notify and consult with her husband on the abortion decision, it necessarily compels speech in the marital relationship. The court in
Scheinberg'00 failed to address the issue, though the argument was
clearly preserved and the request for a rehearing of the case rested on
it. A statute having the potential to impair an individual's freedom of
speech is deserving of careful consideration.
Historically, first amendment freedom of speech and thought has
received special protection as a fundamental liberty serving as the "indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 101 Judicial and philosophical justification for free speech emphasizes the importance of individual self-expression and its forwarding impact on the
goals of representative democracy and self-government. 10 2 In past
cases, first amendment issues have typically focused upon the permissibility of an individual's exercise of free speech in the public forum.
Government interference with this right, in the form of state regulation, has been upheld where the speech is directed to producing or inciting imminent lawless action,103 encouraging subversive activities during wartime 04 or interfering with public order and tranquility. 05
The Florida statute represents a significant and novel departure
from first amendment issues considered in the past. A distinguishing
characteristic of the statute is that it attempts to compel speech, rather
than inhibit its free exercise. Additionally, the statute seeks to regulate
purely private speech in the context of the marital relationship, in contrast to previous instances of permissible state regulation of speech in
the public forum. There is no case law precedent permitting a state to
compel purely private speech, though several court decisions have interpreted the nature of this first amendment right.
Wooley v. Maynard08 establishes that the right of freedom of
thought, protected against state action by the first and fourteenth
amendments, includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all. Both are "complementary components of
100.
101.

659 F.2d 476.
Id. at 327.

102.

G.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 444 (1969).
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).

GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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the broader concept of individual freedom of mind. ' 10 7 Freedom of
speech and association are not, however, absolute.10 8 "They are susceptible of [state] restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger
to interests which the state may lawfully protect."11 9 Accordingly, state
restrictions on free exercise of speech in the public forum have been
justified by state concerns for public welfare. However, the right to remain silent enjoys an even greater protection than the right to speak
freely. Involuntary speech may be "commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds"110 than those for which the state can prohibit speech. Following this analysis, a court should determine whether
the notice and consultation requirement prevents an immediate threat
to the husband's procreative ability and whether this threat, like speech
107. Id. at 714.
108. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
109. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
110. Id. at 633. The classic right to silence cases have arisen in the context of
state interests in controlling subversive activities. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., the Court reversed a contempt conviction arising from a witness'
refusal to disclose to a state legislative committee names of local NAACP chapter
members. The committee sought this information in connection with its investigation of
local Communist activities. Though this was considered a valid legislative interest, the
Court nevertheless required a showing that this interest outweigh the individual's constitutionally protected right of privacy in his views or associations. Further, in order to
establish an overriding legislative interest, the Court required that a "substantial connection" between the information sought and the subject matter of the inquiry be
shown. Because no nexus was proved between the local NAACP and Communist activities, the Court refused to compel disclosure. 372 U.S. 539 (1963). Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). Thus, in Scheinberg, the state must not only prove that its
interest in the procreative potential of a marriage is a valid legislative concern, but
must also show that this interest outweighs or subordinates the married woman's right
to privacy in her communications. Further, the state must show that a nexus exists
between the information sought to be compelled and its interest in the procreative potential of the marriage. 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
Additionally, the requirement that legislation infringing upon protected speech be
precisely drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake emerged in cases
involving disclosures of organizational membership where an individual sought public
employment or office. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). The Court
in this case held that a governmental employer could not condition employment upon
an oath that the employee has not or will not engage in protected speech activities. Id.
Similarly, the court in Scheinbergshould not condition a married woman's access to an
abortion upon consultation with her husband.
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inciting riot, is a lawful subject for state regulation. Since infringements on the right to remain silent must be justified by more urgent
state interests than those interests justifying restrictions on the right to
speak freely, it is imperative to compare the nature of the state's interests in both situations. By way of illustration, where dangers of subversive activity and hostile demonstrations are exacerbated by an individual's exercise of free speech in a public place, the state has the duty to
protect its citizens. When a wife desires an abortion, is it proper for the
state to intrude into the private realm of marital communication by
requiring her to voice such an intention as a means of protecting the
husband's procreative potential?"" The nature of the individual rights
involved in this question render it worthy of a judicial response.
The Right of Privacy
Certain aspects of an individual's right of privacy are infringed by
state limitations on first amendment guarantees of freedom of thought
and speech. Privacy, in the abortion context, involves both an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and independence in making important decisions. 12 The Florida statute attempts to
compel a woman to speak on a private matter about which she might
choose to remain silent. Further, if a woman is forced to notify and
consult her husband, she loses that feature of privacy which protects
one's independence in decision-making. These characteristics of the
statute are antithetical to fundamental notions of privacy.
*The Equal Protection Argument
In addition to first amendment and privacy attacks on the statute,
perhaps the most severe criticism is based upon equal protection
grounds. Where fundamental rights are involved the equal protection
11.

"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no

official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,

religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein." Id. at 642.
112. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). (But note the Court in
Whalen permitted the state to keep computerized records of the names of persons who
obtain certain drugs by prescription owing to its effective security system to prevent
unauthorized disclosure.)
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inquiry must consider whether the notice and consultation provision is
necessary and effective in furthering state interests and whether the
legislation is narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.""3
The district court in Scheinberg found the statute inadequately
drawn because it was both over and underinclusive. It was held overinclusive because it made "no exception for a married woman carrying
the child of someone other than her husband." '114 As the statute is written, the husband's interest in the fetus arises from his marriage, not his
paternity. Despite the district court's analysis, the court of appeals
side-stepped this anomaly, focusing instead on whether the abortion
procedure had more than a "de minimis" effect on his wife's childbearing capabilities.11 5 The district court found the statute underinclusive because "it does not require a woman to notify and consult with
her husband about an impending hysterectomy or tubal ligation," 1'
and these surgical procedures altogether foreclose marital procreative
potential. It concluded that these failings in the statute rendered it unconstitutional. It should also be noted that a husband does not have to
consult with his wife if he desires a vasectomy. The court of appeals
acknowledged that the statute was indeed underinclusive. Nevertheless,
it reversed the lower court's ruling finding that court's analysis unpersuasive; Florida's legislature may properly choose abortion as singularly
deserving of special legislation.

113. 410 U.S. 113. For a discussion of the necessary relationship between classifications and legislative objectives for equal protection purposes, see Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). The Constitution's demand for equal protection of the laws requires that those who are similarly
situated be similarly treated. The success of a classification is determined by the measure of its ability to treat similarly those similarly situated with respect to furthering a
valid state interest. Where fundamental rights are involved, the legislative means must
bear a "tight fit" to the legislative ends sought. G. GUNTHER, supra note 102.
114. 482 F. Supp. at 540.
115. "The state interest sought to be furthered by this legislation encompasses
It encompasses furmore than merely the husband's interest in a particular fetus ....
thering the institutional integrity of the marital relationship, and of the family." 659
F.2d at 486. Cf. 518 F.2d 787.
116.

659 F.2d at 486.
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Conclusion
The spousal notice and consultation provision should have been declared unconstitutional once the court of appeals determined it constituted an obstacle to a married woman's first trimester abortion choice.
By purporting to balance an individual's actual constitutional guarantee of privacy against a state's compelling interest in marital procreative potential, the appellate panel invited a novel -albeit ill-advisedapproach to the abortion question. Certainly, opponents of abortion
may take advantage of this new potential weapon and structure restrictive statutes under the pretext of procreative potential. One must wonder whether procreative potential would command equal attention if a
woman sought to regulate or restrict her husband's vasectomy decision.
Finally, one must not ignore the personal protections afforded by Roe
and wonder whether procreative potential will succeed to ultimately
erode what progress Roe has intelligently effected.
Bambi G. Blum
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